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GETTING TIME FOR AN ACQUITTED CRIME:
THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL USE OF ACQUITTED CONDUCT
AT SENTENCING AND NEW YORK'S CALL FOR CHANGE
Megan Sterback*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, Mark Hum's home in Wisconsin was raided by po-
lice resulting in his arrest and indictment on charges of possessing
fifty or more grams of cocaine base with intent to distribute, violating
21 U.S.C. § 841(a).' At trial, Hum's live-in girlfriend testified that
the cocaine base belonged to other people living in his home.2 After
two days, the jury convicted him of possession of cocaine, but acquit-
ted him of the cocaine base offenses.3 For his possession conviction,
Hum should have faced a sentence between twenty-seven and thirty-
three months under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guide-
lines").4 However, the sentencing judge treated Hum as guilty of the
cocaine base charge and he was sentenced to 210 months in prison.s
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that Hum's
sentence was based almost entirely on acquitted conduct, but failed to
conduct a constitutional analysis. 6 The Court instead followed Su-
preme Court precedent and held that "the district court's use of ac-
quitted conduct did not violate Hum's Sixth Amendment or [D]ue
[P]rocess rights."7 On March 31, 2008, the Supreme Court declined
Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2010, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.
United States v. Hum, 496 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 2007).
2 Id.
Id. at 785.
4 Id. at 786.
Id. at 787.
6 Hurn, 496 F.3d at 788 ("[A]cquittal on criminal charges does not prove that the defend-
ant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt." (quoting
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 155 (1997) (internal quotations omitted))).
7 Id. at 789.
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to consider Hum's appeal and the federal rule allowing acquitted
conduct to be considered as a relevant factor in sentencing remains.
In all federal sentencing proceedings, the judge is permitted to
enhance a defendant's sentence based on conduct, which he was ac-
quitted of at trial, if that conduct can be shown by a preponderance of
the evidence.9 However, the leading Supreme Court case, United
States v. Watts,'0 which established the rule permitting the considera-
tion of acquitted conduct during the sentencing phase, conducted an
insufficient evaluation and analysis of Sixth Amendment concerns
and the policy arguments against such practice."
In 2005, the Court in United States v. Booker 2 addressed the
constitutionality of the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing and
whether the Guidelines, as interpreted, violated the Sixth Amendment
by allowing judges to take on the role of fact-finder on issues that the
government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.'3 In Booker,
the Court set forth two separate majority opinions: one opinion on the
merits and another regarding remedies.' 4 The Court held that the
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment on the merits, and in the
remedial opinion the Court simultaneously held the Guidelines to be
valid as advisory. "5 Booker did not affect the holding in Watts nor
overrule it; but the question remains whether Booker should be inter-
preted as declaring the use of acquitted conduct in sentencing a viola-
tion of a defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury under the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.16
Although the federal circuits generally adhere to the federal
rule as proscribed by Watts, "there is a growing chorus-from the
bench and bar--calling into question the constitutionality and funda-
mental fairness of this rule, which has been called a 'repugnant' and
[a] 'uniquely malevolent' aspect of the current federal sentencing re-
8 Hum v. United States, 552 U.S. 1295 (2008).
9 Watts, 519 U.S. at 157.
'o 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
1 Id. at 154. In Watts, the United States Supreme Court held that acquitted conduct used
in consideration at sentencing is "consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id.
12 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
" Id. at 245.
14 See id at 220.
"s See id. at 226.
16 See id. at 240.
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gime."" New York courts have recently expressed distaste for the
federal rule and have reversed sentences that relied on evidence of
acquitted conduct at sentencing.' 8 This Comment will focus on fed-
eral cases and New York state court decisions that have illustrated the
concern over the federal rule. Part II will give a background and his-
tory of the Guidelines and its application. Part III will provide an
analysis of the current federal rule as established in United States v.
Watts. Part IV will illustrate the need for change and the argument
that the federal rule is unconstitutional by examining recent decisions
in the New York Court system rejecting the federal rule.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Our criminal justice system imposes punishment upon those
defendants who are afforded the right to a trial by jury and a convic-
tion by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' 9 However,
federal judges are permitted to enhance a defendant's sentence based
on conduct from which he was acquitted at trial if that conduct can be
shown by a preponderance of the evidence.20 The Supreme Court
case establishing this rule, United States v. Watts, led to difficulty in
application among the courts and constitutional concerns due to an
insufficient analysis of the Sixth Amendment and lack of guidance on
the proper scope of allowing adjudicated conduct to weigh in on a de-
fendant's sentence.21 In an effort to clarify the issue, the Court con-
sidered whether the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment by al-
lowing judges to reevaluate issues that the government failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial in the 2005 case United States v.
Booker.22
17 Eric Tirschwell & Michael Eisenkraft, Use ofAcquitted Conduct in Federal Sentencing,
242 N.Y. L.J. 4 (2009) (citing Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (Stevens, J., dissenting)); United States v.
Canania, 532 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J., concurring)).
18 See People v. Black, 821 N.Y.S.2d 593, 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (stating that "[t]his
[c]ourt has repeatedly held that a sentencing court may not base its sentence on crimes of
which the defendant was acquitted"); People v. Varlack, 687 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1999) ("The court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant as a persistent felony
offender on the robbery count, because the court wrongly took into account the charges of
which defendant was acquitted.").
19 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
20 Watts, 519 U.S. at 157.
21 Id. at 154.
22 Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
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A.. Pre-Guidelines
Before the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were imposed,
judges had virtually unlimited discretion in sentencing and it was dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to determine the motivations behind a
judge's sentence.23 In Williams v. New York,24 the Supreme Court
sanctioned the use of acquitted conduct in sentencing for the first
time.25 Subsequently, judges grew accustomed to the practice of in-
dividualized sentencing to reflect the accused and not the crime ac-
cused.26 The sentencing system was grounded on judicial discretion
in support of indeterminate sentencing.27 Criticism of the " 'almost
wholly unchecked and sweeping' " powers of the judiciary rapidly
developed.28 In response, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984.29 The Act created the United States Sentencing Com-
mission, consisting of seven members appointed by the President and
confirmed by Congress, to come up with the guidelines sentencing
system.30
B. The Creation of the Guidelines: Charge Offense vs.
Real Offense System
The Commission was created to provide a fair system of sen-
tencing and had to decide whether to promote a charge offense sys-
tem or a real offense system of sentencing.' A "charge offense" sys-
tem is where a defendant's conviction is a direct result of his
32sentence. On the other hand, a "real offense" system allows judges
23 See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 55 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
24 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
25 See generally id.
26 See id. at 247.
27 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
28 Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 228 (1993) (quoting
MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973)).
29 Id. at 224.
30 28 U.S.C.A. § 991 (West 2010) (effective Oct. 13, 2008).
31 Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1988).
32 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, subsec. 1 (2009) (defining a "charge
offense" as a sentence being based "upon the conduct that constitutes the elements of the
offense for which the defendant was charged and of which he was convicted").
1226 [Vol. 26
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to consider all parts and factors surrounding the event or offense of
which the conviction was based.33
The "charge offense" is a very systematic and straightforward
approach where a pre-determined punishment for a crime in which a
defendant has been convicted is issued.34 While there is much to be
gained from this model, it does not allow consideration of the context
and individuality of specific events." The "charge offense" model
addresses consistency and discretion problems, but is too objective in
that it does not distinguish between the individual defendants and
their crimes.36 It is uncharacteristic of our criminal justice system to
impose the same sentence for a defendant who is convicted of a hei-
nous and unusually malicious murder and a defendant who commits a
heat-of-blood murder. The "charge offense" system accomplishes a
certain level of fairness procedurally, but it is inadequate to serve as
an effective model of punishment on a case-by-case basis.3 1
The "real offense" system is based on an ideology from the
other side of the spectrum. This model primarily focuses on the indi-
vidual case and underlying factors of each crime. 39 Here, the oppo-
site problems are presented. This model does virtually nothing to
curtail a judge's discretion, allowing the court to apply a lower stand-
ard of proof in deciding what conduct can be considered in punishing
a defendant.4 0 Moreover, it is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of
Evidence and federal procedural rules, which provide limitations.4'
Ultimately, the Sentencing Commission produced a complex
model system of sentencing called the Federal Sentencing Guide-
33 Id. (defining a "real offense" as a sentence being based "upon the actual conduct in
which the defendant engaged regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or convict-
ed").
3 Breyer, supra note 31, at 9.
SId
36 id
3 Id. at 9-10. Compare People v. Fink, 674 N.Y.S.2d 793, 794-95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(holding that the defendant's sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison was not an abuse
of the county court's discretion because the defendant had committed a "brutal and sense-
less" murder), with People v. Lewis, 123 N.Y.S.2d 81, 87 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953) (holding
that the defendant's sentence for manslaughter in the first degree should be reduced to seven
and one-half to fifteen years in prison because the defendant had acted in the heat of pas-
sion).
38 Breyer, supra note 31, at 9-10.
3 Id. at 10.
' Id. at 11.
41 id
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lines.42 Despite the original concern of broad judicial discretion that
the Sentencing Commission was designed to solve, it adopted a qua-
si-real offense system.43 When the Commission was created by Con-
gress, its duty was to "provide certainty and fairness in [congruence
with] the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar criminal conduct."" However, under the re-
gime set forth by the Commission, the relevant conduct of an offense
has been interpreted to include conduct of which a criminal defendant
was acquitted.45 In other words, the court is permitted to consider
almost any conduct surrounding a case. The broad and unlimited in-
terpretation of the term relevant has more or less reinvented some of
the same sentencing disparities that the Commission was created to
eliminate.
C. Relevant Conduct as Defined by the Guidelines
There is a longstanding principle that a sentencing court has
broad discretion to consider factors and conduct that may have been
inadmissible evidence at trial.46 The Guidelines incorporated relevant
conduct, which a judge is permitted to consider at sentencing, into
sections 1B1.3 and 1B1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines.47 The range
of conduct that is permissible for a judge to consider at the sentencing
phase includes unlawful acts or omissions occurring in relation to the
42 Eang Ngov, Judicial Nullification ofJuries: Use ofAcquitted Conduct at Sentencing, 76
TENN. L. REV. 235, 245 (2009).
43 See David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real Offense Sentencing and the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REv. 403, 418 (1993) (stating that while a judge
under the old system had discretion to consider real offense conduct, he "was not required to
take into account any real-offense behavior, as would be the case with binding sentencing
guidelines incorporating real-offense sentencing").
4 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT
OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF
SENTENCING REFORM 11 (2004), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_year-studyfull.pdf.
45 See United States v. Poyato, 454 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the
Guidelines require sentencing courts to consider whether the defendant possessed a firearm
because possession constitutes "relevant conduct" for sentencing).
' See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3661 (West 2009) ("No limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence."); see also Watts, 519 U.S. at 151.
4 See Watts, 519 U.S. at 151-52.
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offense of conviction deemed vital in determining the defendant's
culpability. 48  This definition encompasses uncharged and un-
adjudicated conduct that occurred in relation to a defendant's convic-
tion as relevant to the determination of an appropriate punishment,
but the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing is not explicitly ad-
dressed in the Guidelines.4 9 It was the Court in Watts that established
acquitted conduct as permissible under the scope of evidence to be
considered during sentencing." Acquitted conduct is an act "for
which the offender was criminally charged and formally adjudicated
not guilty, typically by the finder of fact after trial."" While there is
an obvious difference between un-adjudicated "other act" evidence
and acquitted conduct, Watts has put both on equal grounds at sen-
tencing.
D. The Guidelines System Applied
The Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual provides a
Sentencing Table that is used to calculate an appropriate sentencing
range for individualized conduct based on a period within the statuto-
ry sentencing range of the convicted conduct.52 The Table consists of
a vertical and horizontal axis, which graphs a range according to the
offense level of the conviction and the criminal history category, re-
spectively.
Before a judge sentences a defendant, the probation depart-
ment typically recommends a sentence to the judge based upon the
mandates provided in the Sentencing Guidelines.54 The Sentencing
Guidelines table consists of forty-three offense levels and six crimi-
nal history categories, making up a table of 258 sentencing ranges. 5
The probation department then hands over a calculation to the
48 See Barry L. Johnson, IfAt First You Don't Succeed-Abolishing the Use ofAcquitted
Conduct in Guidelines Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. REV. 153, 159-60 (1996); see U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § BI .3(a)(1)(B) (2010) (stating that a defendant is to be
held accountable for all criminal activity "whether or not charged as a conspiracy").
49 See id at 160.
50 Watts, 519 U.S. at 157.
5 See Johnson, supra note 48, at 157.
52 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2010).
* See id.
* See id § 1B1.1 (2009).
s Id. ch. 5, pt. A.
1229
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sentencing judge who holds a hearing where both parties can argue
the recommendation.5 6 The judge ultimately determines the applica-
ble range and typically sentences a defendant to a term within the
formulated Sentencing Guidelines range."
E. The Justification and Purpose of Sentencing
The significance of punishment, in relation to our criminal
justice system, has been justified in many different shades. Punish-
ment has been said to enforce sovereign authority.5 8 It has also been
characterized as a specific deterrent.59 One goal of punishment is re-
habilitation. 60 Rehabilitation is the theory that punishment is the ap-
propriate vehicle to transform a delinquent member of society into a
law abiding citizen. 6 1 While the pre-Guidelines approach allowed a
judge to use unlimited discretion in sentencing, the Guidelines only
allow the judge to consider factors of relevant conduct. 62 For exam-
ple, unlike the prior regime, a judge cannot consider certain personal
information such as employment facts, psychological background,
and family background under the Guidelines. 63 Therefore, the Guide-
lines effectively rejected rehabilitation as a goal of punishment be-
cause the judge is no longer considering the individual needs of the
defendant in terms of rehabilitation.64 The Commission was directed
to ensure that "the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of impos-
ing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabili-
tating the defendant." 65 However, the Guidelines seem to be more
concerned with what the crime is worth rather than what methods
would rehabilitate the individual defendant. 66  "[C]urrent practices
56 Erica K. Beutler, A Look At The Use OfAcquitted Conduct In Sentencing, 88 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 809, 813 (1998).
"Id. at 813-14.
58 Elizabeth E. Joh, "If it Suffices to Accuse": United States v. Watts and the Reassessment
ofAcquittals, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 887 (1999).
59 Id.
6 See id. at 890.
6 Id. at 890-91.
62 See Beutler, supra note 56, at 810, 812-14.
63 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(d) (West 2010) (effective Oct. 6, 2006).
' See id. § 994(k).
65 Id. (emphasis added).
Joh, supra note 58, at 900 (stating that "the Sentencing Guidelines and other contempo-
rary penal practices indicate that while the offender must 'pay for' and be responsible for his
1230 [Vol. 26
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 26 [2010], No. 4, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss4/7
2011] GETTING TIME FOR ANACQUITTED CRIME
tend to treat offenders as equally situated, rational, responsible actors
or aggregates of statistical information."6
For all purposes of punishment, the common thread is the
message that the punishment will send to society. "Sensitive to shifts
outside of the courtroom, and the prison, penal practices often reflect
the dominant social themes of the moment."6  However, it seems to
be less emphasized in the courts that punishment can also create so-
cial themes.
Moreover, "[p]unishment plays a powerful teaching func-
tion."70 The practice and policy of sentencing and punishment affects
the way society reflects upon itself and its members' actions.71
Therefore, "[i]f punishment both reflects and constitutes social
knowledge, then practices of punishment ought to be interpreted as
representations and reflections of social values."72 It can be generally
inferred that our society values the right to a trial by jury. Allowing
the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing does not reflect the pur-
pose and significance of that fundamental right.
III. THE FEDERAL RULE: APPRENDI, WA TTS, BOOKER, AND
APPLICATION IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
A. Background and Justification of United States v.
Watts
In United States v. Watts, the Court decided that acquitted
conduct can be used to enhance a sentence for a conviction on anoth-
er charge as long as that evidence can be proved by preponderance of
the evidence. In Watts, the defendant was charged with possessing
cocaine base with intent to distribute and using a firearm in relation
to a drug offense. 74 Both charges were deemed to violate statutory
conduct, attempts at reforming the offender will be of secondary or of no importance").
6 Id. at 892.
68 Id at 888.
6 Id. at 887-88.
70 Id. at 902.
71 Joh, supra note 58, at 902.
72 Id. at 903.
73 Watts, 519 U.S. at 157.
7" See id. at 149-50.
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provisions. At trial, Watts was convicted of the possession charge,
but acquitted on the charge of using a firearm in relation to a drug of-
fense.76 At sentencing, the district court found, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that Watts did in fact use a firearm in relation to the
drug offense.77 Upon the court's own interpretation of the facts,
Watts' sentence was enhanced accordingly.7' The court of appeals
vacated the sentence and reasoned that the district court rejected the
jury's determination of facts.79 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed the court of appeals' decision by reinstating the district
court's enhanced sentence.o
Initially, the Supreme Court turned to 18 U.S.C. § 3661 and
the principle that courts should have broad discretion in what infor-
mation is considered for the purpose of imposing a sentence.8 1 The
Court also relied on the "encouragement" of the Sentencing Guide-
lines to factor in "all other related conduct, whether or not it resulted
in a conviction." 82 Finally, the Court relied on its decision in Witte v.
United States.83 In Witte, the Court held that "consideration of in-
formation about the defendant's character and conduct at sentencing
does not result in 'punishment' for any offense other than the one of
which the defendant was convicted." 84
As a result of this analysis, in a per curium decision, the ma-
jority in Watts established the rule allowing consideration of conduct
underlying an acquitted charge in sentencing if it is shown by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.85 The majority did not consider the role
or importance of the jury in our criminal justice system, a defendant's
75 Id
76 id.
77 Id. at 150.
7 Watts, 519 U.S. at 150.
79 Id
s Id. at 157.
81 Id. at 151. See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3661 (stating that "[n]o limitation shall be placed on
the infonation concerning ... conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court ...
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence").
8 Watts, 519 U.S. at 154.
83 Id. at 154-55. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 408 (1995).
SId. at 401.
8s Watts, 519 U.S. at 156 (reasoning that " 'an acquittal in a criminal case does not pre-
clude the Government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action
governed by a lower standard of proof' " (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342,
349 (1990))).
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Sixth Amendment rights under the Constitution, or the important dis-
tinction between an acquittal and the relevant conduct made manda-
tory for consideration by the Guidelines. 86 In a lengthy dissent, Jus-
tice Stevens expressed concern that the majority's opinion was
repugnant to the doctrines inherent in our criminal justice system.87
B. Apprendi and Booker: The Constitutional Analysis
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,8 the Court held that jury protec-
tions are relevant to both conviction and sentencing.89 The Court
emphasized that any fact the judge might use in enhancing a defend-
ant's sentence must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." The Court reasoned that justice requires that proce-
dural safeguards apply equally to the acts singled out for
punishment.91 "The Apprendi decision, while ruling only on conduct
that extends a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum,
reflects the Court's deep concern with acquitted-conduct sentences
based upon facts not submitted to and explicitly determined by a ju-
ry." 92
In United States v. Booker, which was decided in 2005, the
Court extended Apprendi to the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
holding that the defendant's enhanced sentence violated his Sixth
Amendment guarantee of the right to a trial by jury.93 At trial, de-
fendant Booker was convicted by a jury on charges of possessing at
least fifty grams of crack cocaine. 94 There was evidence admitted at
trial that Booker possessed 92.5 grams.95 The sentencing judge found
that Booker possessed an additional 566 grams of crack by a prepon-
8 See U.S CONST. amend. VI.
87 Watts, 519 U.S. at 170 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
89 Id. at 484 (stating that "due process and associated jury protections extend ... 'to the
length of his sentence' " (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 251
(1998))).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 476.
92 Mark T. Doerr, Not Guilty? Go To Jail. The Unconstitutionality ofAcquitted-Conduct
Sentencing, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 235, 242 (2009).
93 Booker, 543 U.S. at 228-29.
9 Id. at 221.
95 Id
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derance of the evidence.9 6  The jury never even heard such evi-
dence.97 In light of the judge's findings, Booker was sentenced ten
years beyond the Guidelines' range for the charge of which he was
convicted.98 The Court held that the Sixth Amendment applies and
"[a]ny fact ... which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a
jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt." 99 On the merits, the Court relied on case
law which provided the principle that every fact in a criminal trial
must be a question for the jury and proved by the highest standard-
beyond a reasonable doubt.'00
However, the Court did not want to render the Guidelines un-
constitutional due to the great efforts and concerns addressed by the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.101 In the remedial majority, the
Court altered the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a).'02 The Court made the Guidelines a mandatory considera-
tion at sentencing, but re-fashioned the Guidelines as advisory in the
imposition of sentencing.10 3
The dual decision in Booker created uncertainty about the sta-
tus and constitutionality of Watts. While Apprendi, coupled with
Booker, seems to strengthen the argument that the use of acquitted
conduct at sentencing violates the Sixth Amendment, the circuit
courts have been reluctant to so declare.
C. Federal Cases Applying Watts and the Booker
Conflict
In the circuit courts, Booker's declaration of the Guidelines
being merely advisory has created some of the same uncertainty and
96 id.
97 id.
9 Booker, 543 U.S. at 221.
9 Id. at 244.
1" See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (stating that "any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt"); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 586 (2002) ("[A] fact-no
matter how the State labels it-must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.").
1o1 See Job, supra note 58, at 892.
102 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
103 Id. at 259-60.
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inconsistencies that the Guidelines were enacted to prevent. 104 Alt-
hough the federal courts adhere to the principle that use of acquitted
conduct is permissible at sentencing, selective interpretation ignores
the merits of Booker.'5 "[Federal courts] have recognized that Watts
is not controlling on the Sixth Amendment question, [but] they have
nevertheless been influenced by the other courts that erroneously pre-
sumed the contrary."l06 The need to adhere to the precedent estab-
lished in Booker, and the nature of the conflicting dual opinion, has
led to confusion among the federal courts. Both the Fourth Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit have directly and expressly denounced the prac-
tice of considering acquitted conduct at sentencing, but have not de-
clared it unconstitutional based on Supreme Court precedent.'07 The-
se circuit court cases illustrate the need for a more concrete and
solidified rule.
The Second Circuit has held firm to Supreme Court precedent
as established in Booker and Watts and refused to deviate. However,
before Booker, the court did so reluctantly when it dealt with whether
acquitted conduct can be used to enhance a defendant's sentence as
seen in United States v. Concepcion.'0o In Concepcion, three mem-
bers of a wholesale and retail narcotic organization appealed from
judgments against them.'09 One of the defendants in that case, Frias,
was convicted at trial for possessing an unregistered firearm and for
'0 See Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 665, 676 (2006)
(finding that Booker increased regional inconsistency in sentencing patterns).
105 See Ngov, supra note 42, at 242.
10 People v. Rose, 776 N.W.2d 888, 888 n.3 (Mich. 2010).
107 See United States v. Ibanga, 271 F. App'x 298, 300 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that the
use of acquitted conduct at sentencing "makes the constitutional guarantee of a right to a jury
trial quite hollow") (internal quotations omitted). While the Fourth Circuit did not disagree
or question the analysis of the lower court, it emphasized that it was bound by Supreme
Court precedent that this conduct may be used. Id. at 301; see also United States v. Settles,
530 F.3d 920, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Baylor, 97 F.3d 542, 549-50 (D.C. Cir.
1996) ("As a result [of the sentence enhancement], [the defendant's] base offense level and
his ultimate sentence were exactly the same as they would have been had the jury found him
guilty, instead of acquitting him, on the [more serious charge]. There is something funda-
mentally wrong with such a result... . [T]o my mind the use of acquitted conduct in an iden-
tical fashion with convicted conduct in computing an offender's sentence leaves such a jag-
ged scar on our constitutional complexion that periodically its presence must be highlighted
and reevaluated in the hopes that someone will eventually pay attention, either through a
grant of certiorari to resolve the circuit split, or a revision of the guidelines by the Sentencing
Commission, or a legislation to bar such a result . j....
los 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992).
" Id. at 374-75.
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possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.' He was acquitted of two
other narcotics charges."' The district court enhanced his sentence
on the basis of the narcotics charges and Frias appealed."12
The Second Circuit acknowledged the federal rule allowing
the consideration of acquitted conduct during the sentencing phase,
but expressed concerns."'3 The Presentence Report prepared during
Frias' sentencing was calculated on the basis that his firearm convic-
tions were in connection with the Organization's narcotics opera-
tion-the conduct of which the jury had acquitted him.1 4 The district
court also suggested that the offense level should have been adjusted
pursuant to Guidelines section 2D1.1(b)(1) to thirty-eight based on
the ground that Frias was in possession of a firearm during the com-
mission of a drug offense."' On appeal, the Second Circuit noted
that raising Frias' appropriate sentencing range from 12-18 months
imprisonment to 210-262 months was not what the Sentencing
Commission had intended in imposing the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines."'6 The Court agreed with the district court in that application of
the Guidelines resulted in an enhanced sentence range for Frias, but
expressed "doubt that, with respect to conduct of which the defendant
was acquitted, the Commission intended so extreme an increase."'
The court vacated Frias' sentence and remanded the case to permit
the lower court "to consider whether or not to depart from the offense
level [determined under] strict application of the Guidelines."" 8
While this case was decided before Booker, subsequent cases in New
York have set limitations on the scope of using acquitted conduct at
sentencing, but have refused to address the constitutionality of
Watts.' "
10 Id. at 374.
11 See id.
112 Id. at 374-75.
113 Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 389.
114 Id. at 385.
115 Id.
116 Id at 389.
117 Id.
118 Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 389.
119 See United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518, 527 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding "[we] join the
Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits in rejecting a claim that, after Booker, district courts
may no longer consider acquitted conduct when sentencing within the statutory range author-
ized by the jury's verdict"). The court in Vaughn further explained that:
[D]istrict courts may find facts relevant to sentencing by preponderance
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In 2008, Roger Clayton White was brought to trial in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.120
White was convicted of armed robbery and possession of a firearm
with the serial number removed.12 1 White was acquitted on charges
relating to the discharging of a firearm during the robbery and assault
of a law enforcement officer. 122 The district court disregarded the ju-
ry's findings on the acquitted charges and enhanced White's sentence
based on that acquitted conduct.123  Roger Clayton White appealed
his sentence.124 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling
allowing the consideration of acquitted conduct at trial.125
In White, the Sixth Circuit relied on the fact that Booker did
not affect Watts.12 6 While the court recognized that determining the
sentencing range according to conduct underlying a defendant's ac-
quittal might violate the Sixth Amendment post-Booker,127 the court
held that the district court could "rel[y] on acquitted conduct in ap-
plying an advisory guidelines system."128  The court reasoned that
because a criminal defendant can be found not guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, yet be found guilty in a civil proceeding by a lower
standard, the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing by a preponder-
ance of the evidence is justified.129 However, in a criminal proceed-
ing, a defendant faces the loss of his or her freedom. The court in
White attempted to reconcile the counter argument by conceding that
consideration of acquitted conduct can be perceived as unfair, but
emphasized that it is not a mandatory consideration, instead it is
of the evidence, even where the jury acquitted the defendant of that con-
duct, as long as the judge does not impose (1) a sentence in the belief
that the Guidelines are mandatory, (2) a sentence that exceeds the statu-
tory maximum authorized by the jury verdict, or (3) a mandatory mini-
mum sentence under § 841(b) not authorized by the verdict.
Id.
120 United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008).
121 Id. at 382.
122 See id.
123 id
124 id
125 White, 551 F.3d at 382.
126 See id. at 392 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 384.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 385 (stating that "[1]aypersons have become familiar with the distinction from the
pair of O.J. Simpson trials, in which one jury found the crime not proved beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, but another jury found civil liability by a preponderance of the evidence").
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merely discretionary.'
Returning to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hurn as dis-
cussed in the introduction of this Comment, the court in that case
noted that the opinion in Watts itself acknowledged that there had
been disagreement in the circuit courts about whether a sentence,
based almost entirely on acquitted conduct, violates due process
when the district court applies the preponderance of the evidence
standard.131 The Seventh Circuit suggested that preponderance of the
evidence does, in fact, violate due process.132 However, the court re-
frained from conducting an analysis of Hum's due process or Sixth
Amendment rights and held that "[b]ecause clear and convincing evi-
dence supported the district court's finding that Hum possessed co-
caine base with intent to distribute," despite the disregard for the ju-
ry's acquittal on that charge, his Sixth Amendment and due process
rights were not violated.133 The Seventh Circuit seemed to establish
that while finding acquitted conduct at sentencing by a preponder-
ance of the evidence is unconstitutional, when it is found by clear and
convincing evidence it is permissible.134 However, neither standard
affords the defendant the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
promised under the Constitution. 3
IV. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE FEDERAL RULE
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of
whether the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing violates the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution; the federal circuit
courts continue to permit the consideration of acquitted conduct de-
spite Booker, rendering the Federal Sentencing Guidelines discretion-
130 White, 551 F.3d at 386.
13' Hurn, 496 F.3d at 788. Compare United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 833 (9th Cir.
1999) (requiring clear and convincing evidence where use of acquitted conduct results in a
Guidelines range difference of seven levels), with United States v. Ward, 190 F.3d 483, 492
(6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof for acquit-
ted conduct is sufficient).
132 Hurn, 496 F.3d at 789 (deciding that "[njevertheless, the disagreement-which Watts
did not resolve-is not relevant in this case, because the district court applied [a] higher
standard of proof when determining that Hum committed the conduct in question").
13 id.
134 id
13 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
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ary.136 New York courts, on the other hand, have recently begun to
explicitly express concerns with the practice of allowing the use of
acquitted conduct at sentencing.'37 In fact, New York courts have
gone so far as to vacate sentences imposed where the sentencing
court even considered conduct of which the defendant had been ac-
quitted."'
A. A Contradiction of Our Criminal Justice System
At the heart of our legal system rests a defendant's right to be
judged by an impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. 139 Not only is the jury's role as fact-
finder undermined by the federal rule allowing the use of acquitted
conduct at sentencing, but a defendant's right to the highest standard
of proof becomes effectively diminished. Policy concerns have led to
tremendous criticism of the federal rule. 140 Allowing a judge to dis-
credit a jury's determination of the facts by using acquitted conduct
as a factor in sentencing seriously challenges the integrity of our legal
system. The jury is essential to our legal system because it provides a
collection of impartial ears from the community to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. More-
over, the current federal rule gives the government an unfair ad-
vantage at trial, allowing it "the opportunity to take a 'second bite'
[of the apple] after they have previously failed at trial to prove that
the defendant committed the offense beyond a reasonable doubt."' 4'
Therefore, a conviction means virtually nothing under the current
rule, and a criminal defendant may be subject to punishment at the
discretion of the judge by the lowest standard of proof.
Moreover, the federal rule conflicts with the purposes of sen-
tencing as they are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).142 Among other
136 The Court addressed the use of acquitted conduct, but did not address it in terms of the
Sixth Amendment. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
137 See, e.g., Black, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 597; People v. Wilkonson, 724 N.Y.S.2d 18, 20 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001); Varlack, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 96; People v. Maula, 558 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990).
138 See, e.g., Black, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
14 See Doerr, supra note 92, at 249-51 (citing Johnson, supra note 48, at 182-83).
141 Ngov, supra note 42, at 242.
142 See generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2009) (effective Apr. 30, 2003).
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things, the statute urges courts to impose a sentence that reflects "re-
spect for the law" and promotes the limitation of disparities in sen-
tences. 143 Allowing the court the discretion to tack on time based on
evidence of acquitted conduct has the potential to create substantial
disparities in sentencing for similar convictions.'"
Further, allowing sentencing judges to enhance sentences
based on acquitted conduct undermines the role of the jury in our
criminal justice system. 145 "The [United States] Constitution places
the jury at the heart of the criminal justice system as the 'fundamental
guarantor of individual liberty.' "146 If a sentencing court can effec-
tively reject a jury's determination, then what is the point of the trial?
Punishment in our system is communicative to, and reflective
of, our society. Allowing the use of acquittal evidence at sentencing
raises major concerns about the potential impact on society's percep-
tion of our legal system, as well as its overall integrity. The federal
rule tells the general public that a jury's commitment and effort at tri-
al are of very limited importance.147
Moreover, equating uncharged and un-adjudicated conduct
with acquitted conduct ignores the unique and special role of a jury
verdict in our judicial system. An acquittal should be respected since
it legitimizes criminal sentencing, and the integrity of our criminal
justice system.148 It is valid and true that an acquittal does not neces-
sarily mean that a defendant is innocent.149 However, it is incon-
sistent and illogical to assert that the consideration of acquitted con-
duct can be used to enhance a sentence for a defendant that has been
convicted of another charge, but cannot be considered at all to punish
a defendant who has been acquitted of all charges against him. Our
system is dependent upon the standard of proof "beyond a reasonable
doubt" precisely because of the substantial stake of imprisonment and
the risk of stripping the innocent of their liberty.15 0 Therefore, a de-
143 Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
1" Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495.
145 See Johnson, supra note 48, at 180.
146 See Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1179, 1185 (1993)
(citation omitted).
147 See Johnson, supra note 48, at 184.
148 See Lear, supra note 146, at 1185 (arguing that conviction legitimizes incarceration).
149 Watts, 519 U.S. at 155 (quoting United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465
U.S. 354, 361 (1984)).
Iso Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
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fendant receiving more jail time based on conduct proven by a lower
standard of proof conflicts with the foundation of our system. The
Second Circuit has stated that "the public pronouncement [of an ac-
quittal] serves to vindicate the defendant's innocence and, at least to
some extent, alleviate the damage done to his reputation.""' It has
been said that "if justice is not both seen and shown to be done, it is
not and cannot be done at all."' 5 2
B. New York's Call for Change
The American Law Institute and American Bar Association
have joined the states in the chorus against the use of acquitted con-
duct at sentencing.153 In White, the six dissenters were critical of the
majority's blind adherence to Watts as dispositive of the Sixth
Amendment issue.'54 While the circuit courts have not yet declared
the use of acquitted conduct unconstitutional, a few federal judges
have recently conjured up the courage to express constitutional con-
cerns.' 55 Interestingly, many states do not allow the use of acquitted
The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme
of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of
convictions resting on factual error. . . . The accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of
the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because
of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.
Id.
1s1 United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 363 (2d Cir. 1997). See also McNew v. State,
391 N.E.2d 607, 612 (Ind. 1979).
A not guilty judgment is more than a presumption of innocence; it is a
finding of innocence. And the courts of this state, including this Court,
must give exonerative effect to a not guilty verdict if anyone is to respect
and honor the judgments coming out of our criminal justices system.
Id.
152 Joh, supra note 58, at 911 (citing R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 115 (1986)).
' White, 551 F.3d at 395 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
1-4 Id. at 392.
155 Canania, 532 F.3d at 777 (Bright, J., concurring) ("In my view, the Constitution for-
bids judges-Guidelines or no Guidelines-from using 'acquitted conduct' to enhance a de-
fendant's sentence because it violates his or her due process right to notice and usurps the
jury's Sixth Amendment fact-finding role."). See also United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d
654, 658 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) ("Reliance on acquitted conduct in sentenc-
ing diminishes the jury's role and dramatically undermines the protections enshrined in the
Sixth Amendment."); United States v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006) (Barkett,
J., concurring) ("I strongly believe ... that sentence enhancements based on acquitted con-
duct are unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment, as well as the Due Process Clause of
19
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conduct at sentencing.15 6 Some have even gone so far as to declare
the practice unconstitutional.'
The New York Court of Appeals has not yet expressly de-
clared that the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing is a violation of
a defendant's constitutional rights. However, the New York Court of
Appeals has said that if a court is going to consider uncharged crimes
in sentencing, it must first "assure itself that the information upon
which it bases the sentence is reliable and accurate."' 5 8  Moreover,
the trend among the courts in New York has been moving toward the
exclusion of enhanced sentences based on acquitted conduct. 5 9
In People v. Grant,160 the Appellate Division, Second De-
partment held that the trial court erred in considering the charges for
which the defendant was acquitted in sentencing.' 6 ' The Court rea-
soned that "[t]he prohibition against double jeopardy found in both
the [United States] Constitution ([Fifth] Amendment), and the [New
York] Constitution (article I, [section] 6) . . . require[d] resen-
tence."l62
the Fifth Amendment."); United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143, 153 (D. Mass.,
2005) ("To tout the importance of the jury in deciding facts, even traditional sentencing
facts, and then to ignore the fruits of its efforts makes no sense-as a matter of law or logic.").
156 White, 551 F.3d at 394 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
1 State v. Marley, 364 S.E.2d 133,138 (N.C. 1988).
An acquittal is the "legal and formal certification of the innocence of a
person who has been charged with a crime." Once a defendant has been
acquitted of a crime he has been "set free or judicially discharged from
an accusation; released from . . . a charge or suspicion of guilt." A jury
in a criminal case may acquit simply because the state has failed to prove
a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, we cannot en-
ter the inner sanctum of the jury to determine whether it might have con-
victed a defendant had the burden of proof been lower.
Id (internal citations omitted). See also State v. Cote, 530 A.2d 775, 785 (N.H. 1987) (hold-
ing that the constitutional right of due process of law is denied "when a sentencing court may
have used charges that have resulted in acquittals to punish the defendant"); Rose, 776
N.W.2d at 891 (holding that while Michigan law allows consideration of acquitted conduct,
the court granted the defendants leave to appeal to re-consider the constitutionality of the use
of acquitted conduct at sentencing as a general matter "to consider developments in constitu-
tional jurisprudence . . . the widespread criticism of the practice, and the split among state
courts on the issue").
1s People v. Outley, 610 N.E.2d 356, 360 (N.Y. 1993).
19 See Black, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 596 ("This Court has repeatedly held that a sentencing
court may not base its sentence on crimes [for] which the defendant was acquitted.").
16o 595 N.Y.S.2d 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
"' Id. at 39.
162 Id. See U.S. CoNsT. amend V; N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 6.
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In Black, the Appellate Division, Third Department refused to
apply the Watts rationale to a case where a justification defense was
offered.163 The court in Black remanded the case for re-sentencing,
reasoning that the trial court "erroneously relied on the counts of
which defendant was acquitted in making its sentencing determina-
tion."16 4
In People v. Rogers,165 the Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment did not review the defendant's contention that his verdict was
inconsistent due to the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing because
he failed to raise the issue before the jury was discharged.166 Howev-
er, the court ultimately vacated the sentence as being vindictive and
raised concern that the use of acquitted conduct promotes unfounded
enhancement of sentencing. 167 "[A]lthough defendant was acquitted
of the murder count, the court stated at sentencing that it 'felt con-
strained to impose the sentence because a death was involved.' "1168
Moreover, in People v. Reeder,169 the Appellate Division, Se-
cond Department remanded the case for resentencing before a differ-
ent Justice because the lower court's "remarks demonstrated that it
improperly considered crimes of which the defendant was acquitted
as a basis for sentencing."o70 It is rare to see the court use such harsh
and critical language towards a "brother of the bench." This type of
remand is illustrative of the strong argument against the use of ac-
quitted conduct at sentencing.
In the more recent case of People v. Durand,"'7 the Appellate
Division, Fourth Department vacated the defendant's sentence.172 In
Durand, the defendant was convicted of three counts of criminal
trespass in the third degree and acquitted of three counts of burglary
in the third degree. 73 Both offenses were considered during the sen-
163 Black, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
SId. at 595.
867 N.Y.S.2d 812 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
166 Id. at 813.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 748 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
170 Id. at 276. See also People v. Calderon, 884 N.Y.S.2d 29, 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)
("With respect to defendant's sentence, the record does not establish that it was based on the
crimes of which he was acquitted or any other improper criteria . . . .") (emphasis added).
't 880 N.Y.S.2d 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
172 Id. at 412.
" Id. at 410.
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tencing phase of the defendant's trial.174 The Appellate Division,
Fourth Department held that despite the fact that the defendant
"failed to preserve" the contention, similar to the situation in Rogers,
the lower court erred in considering the counts of burglary for which
he was acquitted."' In view of this matter, the judge declared, "we
nevertheless exercise our power to review that contention as a matter
of discretion in the interest of justice." 1 76 The court in Durand, with-
out being required to address the issue, took it upon itself to express
the injustice of considering acquitted conduct at sentencing. 7 7
V. A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court in Watts was quick to declare that the act
of overriding a jury's determination of not guilty after deliberation
does not violate a defendant's constitutional rights. 1 78 Still, the Su-
preme Court has yet to directly address whether the use of acquitted
conduct at sentencing violates the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. "7 Federal circuit courts permit the use of ac-
quitted conduct at sentencing, while the states, including New York,
have expressly declared such use to be in violation of a criminal de-
fendant's constitutional rights.
A. Due Process
The Supreme Court has held that acquitted conduct may be
considered at sentencing if it is proven by a preponderance of the ev-
idence. 8 0 A problem with due process arises when a defendant can
be acquitted of his guilt at trial, but may still have to face punishment
for the same particular conduct.' 8 The Supreme Court has held that
a criminal defendant has the constitutional right to have the protec-
1 Id. at 412.
175 Id.
176 Durand, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 412. See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.15(6)(a)
(McKinney 2010).
7 Durand, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
178 Watts, 519 U.S. at 157.
179 The Court addressed the use of acquitted conduct, but did not address it in terms of the
Sixth Amendment. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
Iso See Watts, 519 U.S. at 157; McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84 (1986).
181 See, e.g., Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64.
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tion of the highest standard of proof in all stages of the criminal jus-
tice system.182 The Supreme Court also has recognized that the be-
yond a reasonable doubt standard must be recognized and appreciated
and is vital to promote and maintain confidence in our criminal jus-
tice system, as well as to protect a defendant's fundamental right to a
fair trial under the Fifth Amendment.183 To find a criminal defendant
"effectively guilty," by imposing responsibility for certain actions de-
spite an acquittal, devalues our criminal justice system and violates
the criminal defendant's right to fundamental fairness.
It may be true that due process is satisfied when a court con-
siders un-adjudicated "other act" conduct that has been proven by a
preponderance of the evidence at sentencing;184 however, acquittals
should not fall under the scope of that principle. A judge should not
have the power to disregard a jury verdict, especially by lowering the
standard of proof.18
Despite the disapproving language in numerous circuit court
decisions considering the effect of Booker on the constitutionality of
Watts,186 federal courts continue to allow consideration of conduct
underlying an acquitted charge. In White, as discussed above, the
court acknowledged that after Booker, using evidence of conduct in
which a defendant was acquitted might very well violate the Sixth
Amendment.' 87 However, contrary to that principle, the court held
that a district court may use acquitted conduct in applying the Guide-
lines because they are advisory and no longer mandatory.'88  The
court reasoned that because a criminal defendant can be found not
guilty by a jury, but be held accountable in a civil proceeding by a
preponderance of the evidence, the use of such evidence at sentenc-
ing is constitutional.189 However, in a civil proceeding, an injury is
calculated in damages, whereas a defendant in a criminal proceeding
182 Id. at 364 (holding "that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against convic-
tion except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged").
14 See Watts, 519 U.S. at 157.
185 See Johnson, supra note 48, at 183.
186 See, e.g., United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 683 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that
"[a]t first blush, there might seem to be force to [defendant's] argument").
187 White, 551 F.3d at 384.
188 Id.
19 Id. at 385.
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faces the loss of his freedom, life, reputation, and liberty. The court
recognizes the need for a higher standard of proof in the criminal
context, yet allows the use of the preponderance of the evidence
standard merely because it is not mandated. 190 Considering evidence
of acquitted conduct at sentencing violates due process, and there-
fore, should not be permitted at all.
Due process is about fairness. 191 Fairness, by definition, can-
not incorporate the enhancement of sentences based on acquitted
conduct.192 Booker provides little comfort in the constitutional analy-
sis that was missing in Watts because, after all, Watts remains virtual-
ly unaffected. Watts contradicts the principle of fairness embodied in
our Constitution.
B. Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment has
been said to "protect[] against a second prosecution for the same of-
fense after acquittal[,] . . . protect[] against a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction[,] [a]nd . . . protect[] against multi-
ple punishments for the same offense."' 93 Watts cannot be reconciled
with "the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy ju-
risprudence,"' 94 that a defendant cannot be retried for a criminal
charge. While the sentencing phase is not a rehearing on the merits,
the determination that acquitted conduct occurred during the sentenc-
ing phase, plain and simple, is a reconsideration of adjudicated facts;
the concept rings very close to the protections of the Double Jeopardy
Clause described by the Supreme Court.' 95 It cannot rationally be ac-
cepted that where a defendant is charged with murder and possession
of an illegal firearm, upon a conviction of the weapon charge and ac-
quittal of the murder charge, the sentencing judge could use evidence
of both to punish the defendant.'96 This is the exact principle that the
190 Id. at 386.
191 Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967) (explaining that "the Due Process
Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial").
192 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64.
1 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (citations omitted).
194 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
' Id. at 568-69.
'9 See Watts, 519 U.S. at 157.
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court in Watts is permitting. 197 Regardless of any of the pronounced
limitations on the rule, the entire theory of the rule is unconstitution-
al.198
Federal courts have asserted that the federal rule is not effec-
tively punishing a defendant for an adjudicated crime because there is
a difference "between a sentence and a sentence enhancement." 99
However, if a defendant is acquitted on a single charge, he cannot be
sentenced for that charge.200 Under the federal rule, if a defendant is
convicted of a charge and acquitted of a related charge, the defend-
ant's sentence can be "enhanced." 201 While there is a distinction in
the way the court phrases the punishment, both a sentence and a sen-
tence enhancement result in jail time, and the latter results in punish-
ing a defendant for conduct in which the trial found him not guilty.2 02
Although a trial and sentencing hearing are fundamentally dif-
ferent, a conviction triggers sentencing while an acquittal does not.203
A conviction serves as a legal guilt and, therefore, validates the gov-
ernment's authority to punish a criminal defendant and take away his
rights as a "free" person.204
In the New York case, People v. Grant, the court declared that
double jeopardy requires that sentences, which rely on consideration
of acquitted conduct, be vacated.205 Without any further explanation,
the court was satisfied that the principles of the Double Jeopardy
Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
article I, section 6 of the New York Constitution speak for themselves
on the issue.206 It is now time for the federal courts to follow.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Watts, the majority decision was based primarily on the
197 id.
198 See Beutler, supra note 56, at 842-43.
'99 See id. at 841 (internal quotation marks omitted).
200 id
201 id.
202 Id at 841-42.
203 See Lear, supra note 146, at 1202.
204 Id. at 1222.
205 Grant, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
206 id
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Sentencing Guidelines and case law.207 The Court determined that
"acquitted conduct" was permissible evidence in sentencing under the
"relevant conduct" provision in the Guidelines. 208 It held that the
practice of using "acquitted conduct" at the sentencing phase is con-
gruent to the common law principle that a sentencing judge should
possess a great amount of discretion in imposing a punishment upon
a defendant.209 Subsequently, federal courts have erroneously equat-
ed uncharged and un-adjudicated conduct with acquitted conduct.210
The Supreme Court in Watts failed to properly acknowledge the im-
portance of the acquittal in our criminal justice system despite em-
phasizing the vital nature of an acquittal in so many other contexts
arising out of constitutional issues.2 1'
A criminal defendant is afforded constitutional protections at
trial, but the Watts rule strips the right to a fair trial by an impartial
jury of any meaning. In fact, at sentencing, a criminal defendant is
afforded "at best a shadow of the usual procedural protections."21 2
For example, "the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentenc-
ing" and relevant conduct is not subject to the same restrictions that
the Federal Rules of Evidence provide at trial.213 Furthermore, so
long as the government can prove conduct by a preponderance of the
evidence, acquitted conduct is relevant at sentencing.214
The reason a criminal defendant is afforded more protection
than a civil defendant is because the criminal defendant has substan-
tially more to lose. The justification for permitting the use of acquit-
ted conduct at sentencing, if shown by a preponderance of the evi-
dence when a criminal defendant wins at the criminal proceeding and
loses at the civil proceeding, is, on its face, contradicting to the prin-
ciples that have been established throughout our criminal justice sys-
tem's history.
"Even though Congress, by the sentencing guidelines, has de-
clared that relevant conduct analysis only requires the use of the pre-
207 Watts, 519 U.S. 148.
208 Id. at 154.
209 Id. at 151-52.
210 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (relying on the fact that acquitted
conduct is legally inseparable from uncharged crimes).
211 Watts, 519 U.S. at 156-57.
212 United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, 177 (1st Cir. 1995).
213 United States v. Moncivais, 492 F.3d 652, 658-59 (6th Cir. 2007).
214 Watts, 519 U.S. at 157 (emphasis added).
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ponderance-of-the-evidence standard, the Constitution requires
more." 215 The justifications for declaring the practice of enhancing
sentences based on acquitted conduct are unpersuasive. In fact,
"[permitting] sentence enhancement for acquitted conduct is tanta-
mount to permitting the judge to enter, for sentencing purposes, a
judgment of guilt notwithstanding the verdict on the counts of acquit-
tal, an action which is barred as inconsistent with the Sixth Amend-
ment right to trial by jury." 2 16
While the federal circuits have not been so blind as to ignore
the constitutional violation of the Watts principle, a ruling has not
been made to the contrary. Many states, on the other hand, have de-
clared the use of acquitted conduct as a violation of their state consti-
tutions.21 7 While the New York Court of Appeals has not been as
blunt as other states on the issue, the trial courts have vacated numer-
ous sentences that were enhanced based on evidence underlying a de-
fendant's acquittal.218
The condemnation of the federal rule from circuit judges,
state judges, and legal scholars has been growing rapidly.219 Still, the
Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari for Mark Hum's appeal.220
He, like many other criminal defendants who were not afforded their
constitutional rights, will sit behind bars for a crime in which he was
acquitted. It is now time for the circuit courts to magnify the consti-
tutional concerns and for the legal community to push the Watts rule
back up the steps of the Supreme Court and give back the promise of
the United States Constitution to all citizens who undergo trial in the
criminal justice system.
215 Boyce F. Martin, Jr., The Cornerstone Has No Foundation: Relevant Conduct in Sen-
tencing and the Requirements ofDue Process, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 25, 53 (1993).
216 See Johnson, supra note 48, at 183.
217 See Marley, 364 S.E.2d at 138; Cote, 530 A.2d at 785; Rose, 776 N.W.2d at 891-92.
218 See Black, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 595-96 ("This Court has repeatedly held that a sentencing
court may not base its sentence on crimes of which the defendant was acquitted.").
219 See Tirschwell & Eisenkraft, supra note 17.
220 See Hurn, 552 U.S. 1295.
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